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Abstract
Medical devices often contain many tunable parameters. The optimal setting of these 
parameters depends on the patient’s utility function, which is often unknown. This raises 
two questions. First, how should we optimize the parameters given partial information about 
the patient’s utility? And secondly, what questions do we ask to efficiently elicit this utility 
information? In this paper, we present a coherent probabilistic decision-theoretic framework 
to answer these questions. We illustrate the potential of this framework on a toy problem and 
discuss directions for future research.
1 Introduction
In many cases, a decision maker is uncertain about the user’s preferences, but still wishes to 
recommend (or take) decisions on the user’s behalf. Furthermore, by asking additional questions, 
the decision maker wants to gain further knowledge about these preferences. This problem is 
often referred to as incremental/adaptive utility/preference elicitation. It appears in many different 
settings. Examples can be found in, among others, decision support for prenatal diagnosis [5], travel 
planning [1], and optimal design for heart defibrillators [8]. In this paper we consider the problem 
of adaptive personalization. More specifically, we will work out the setting in which parameters of 
a (medical) device have to be tuned such as to adapt them optimally to a user’s preferences.
Consider for example the task of an optician, trying to fit eyeglasses or lenses to a client. 
Not (quite) knowing the client’s actual visual condition, he tries to find the optimal parameter 
setting (e.g., strength, cylinder, axis) within a limited set of experiments. This is a relatively 
straightforward problem, but for more complex devices, with many different parameters tha t have 
to  be tuned to different conditions, the problem becomes a lot more challenging. Examples are the 
tuning of hearing aid devices, pacemakers, functional electrical stimulation (e.g., for cycling), and 
so on.
In this paper, we will take a decision-theoretic approach towards incremental utility elicitation, 
following [5, 3] and others. In particular, we will derive incremental utility elicitation as a special 
case of Bayesian experimental design with a specific goal function. We will spell out what it amounts 
to  in the setting of param eter tuning and illustrate its potential on a toy problem.
In section 2, we introduce the notation and give some definitions, necessary for the exposition 
th a t follows. In section 3, we then describe the mathematical framework tha t joins the two issues 
above. Section 4 presents the results of a toy experiment and section 5 concludes with directions 
for further research.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Bayesian decision network specifying the utility function of patient i. (b) Bayesian 
network visualizing the probability distribution underlying experiment ^  in the paired-comparison 
experimental set-up. The patient index i and profile a have been omitted.
2 N otation  and definitions
2.1 T h e  u tility  m od el
We will consider the following abstract model of a medical device. A medical device has many 
tuning parameters, summarized in the vector 0 G 0 . The value of 0 determines how an input 
x G X  is transformed to an output represented by a vector y G Y : y  =  F(x; 0). The goal will be 
to find the set of parameters 0* th a t is “optimal” (to be defined below) for patient i. This will 
depend on the environmental conditions, i.e., the typical inputs tha t the patient has to deal with. 
We represent this environment with a probability density P  (x). We assume th a t the domains 0  
and X  are possibly large but finite sets. We can think of having available a library of (relevant) 
inputs and param eter settings.
Each patient has different preferences. The preference of patient i is represented by the utility 
function Mj(y), which depends on the output of the device. We assume th a t utility functions by 
themselves are models tha t can be represented by a finite set of parameters w G W . T hat is, the 
utility function for patient i reads u*(y) =  U(y; w*), where U(y; w) is some given functional form, 
for example, U(y; w) =  ex p (- |w  — v (y ) |2) with v(y) a fixed set of basis functions or features. The 
utility of patient i, represented by the utility  state w*, is unknown and hence we will trea t w* as a 
probabilistic variable.
Although we do not know the patien t’s utility function, following [5] we assume tha t we have 
some vague notion of it, th a t can be represented by a prior probability distribution. This prior 
probability may depend on other information tha t we have about the patient (e.g., age, results of 
other measurements), collected in the patient profile a G A. We will write P(w |a*) for the prior 
probability over the utility states w given patient profile a*. Such prior could perhaps be learned 
from the results on a population of patients.
The model described above can be summarized in the Bayesian decision network sketched in 
Figure 1(a). Squares indicate discrete variables, ovals continuous variables, and diamonds utilities. 
We use lighter gray to indicate th a t the variable is typically observed or given and darker gray to 
indicate tha t this variable is typically to be optimized.
2.2  T h e  e x p er im en ta l se tu p
W ithout loss of generalization, we consider in the following a single user. For ease of notation we 
omit the index i and the (conditioning on the) patient profile a from now on.
We consider the following so-called paired-comparison experimental setup. (there are other 
options, in particular the standard gamble approach as used in [5, 2], see e.g., [12]). An experiment 
e consists of picking an input x from X  in combination with two param eter settings 0i and 02 from
0 , i.e., e =  {x, 01, 02}. The patient is then asked to indicate whether he prefers y1 =  F(x; 01) 
over y2 =  F(x; 02), which we will write as y1 >- y2, or the other way around, y1 -< y2. A standard 
modeling assumption [16, 13] is th a t the patient’s decision in such a paired-comparison forced-choice 
experiment follows a logistic regression model:
P(yi  > V 2) =  11 +  exp {— [u(y1) — u(y2)]}
In psychophysics and econometrics, this model is often referred to as the Bradley-Terry model [4]. 
More specifically indicating the dependence on the utility state w, we write
^   ^ 1 +  exp {—d x [U(x] 9\, w) — U {x \02, w)]} ’  ^ ^
where we used shorthand U(x; 0, w) =  U (F(x; 0); w) and where d G { — 1,1} with d =  1 if y1 >- y2 
and d =  —1 if y1 -< y2. The data  set Dn consists of n  tuples {eM, dM}, ^  = 1 . . .  n.
Experiment ^  is visualized in Figure 1(b). To display several experiments, one should copy 
all the variables with index ^. The nodes for the utilities u% and u% (here treated as “standard” 
probabilistic variables) for different ^  are then linked to the same w.
3 Framework
3.1 B a y esia n  u p d a tin g
Let P (w |D n ) denote the probability density over utility states w after having seen the result of n 
experiments. The probability density after n  + 1  experiments then follows from Bayes’ rule:
P ( „ i a , + 1 ) =  D.) =  • <2 >
with P (d n+1 |en+1, w) from (1) and where the likelihood term  in the denominator follows from 
normalization of the product in the numerator:
P (d |e, Dn ) =  ƒ dw P (d |e ,w )P (w |D n ) . (3)
J w
In other words, Bayes’ rule allows us to keep track of the probability over utility states and hence 
utilities when new data becomes available.
Incremental utility elicitation now has to solve the following questions.
1. Suppose tha t for a particular patient we are given the probability density P(w |D n) as well as 
the environmental conditions P  (x). How should we set the parameters 0 for this patient?
2. Given a probability density, e.g., P (w |D n ), how do we “optimally” choose the next experiment
en+1 =  {xn+1,0n+1,0n+1}?
3.2  B a y esia n  e x p er im en ta l d esign
Incremental utility elicitation can be interpreted as a special case of Bayesian experimental design, 
as e.g. explained in [7, 6] and first presented by Lindley in [18].
Lindley’s framework consists of two decision problems. First an experiment e (in our case the 
tuple {x, 01, 02}) is selected from the possible collection of experiments E  (in our case X  x 0  x 0 ). 
After choosing an experiment e, the outcome d is observed. Based on this new observation d and 
the experiment e, a terminal decision 0 is selected from a set of possible decision rules 0 . A goal 
function G(0, w, e, d) encodes the costs and consequences of using experiment e and decision 0 with 
result d and param eter w. The Bayesian solution to experimental design is now to find the best 
design and best decision rule th a t in expectation achieve the highest goal.
The terminal decision problem amounts to finding the best decision 0* given the observed data 
d under experiment e th a t maximizes the posterior expected goal
G(e, d) =  m a W  dw G(0, w, e, d)P(w |d, e, D n ) , (4)
e JW
where P(w |d, e, Dn ) is the posterior density tha t follows from Bayesian updating of the density 
P (w |D n ) as in (2). The second stage optimization problem involves finding the best experiment 
e tha t maximizes the so-called pre-posterior expected goal tha t follows by integrating (4) over the 
possible outcomes of d:
G (e) =  E  P (d |e ,D n )G(e,d) , (5)
d=± 1
with P (d |e, Dn) from (3). The Bayesian solution to experimental design is provided by the experi­
ment e* th a t maximizes G(e):
e* =  argm axG (e) =  argm ax V  P (d |e ,D n )m ax  f  dw P (w |d ,e ,D n)G (0 ,w ,e ,d ) . (6)e e z ' 8 Wd=±1 JW
This general formulation can be used to find optimal designs for a single experiment and can (at 
least in theory) be easily extended to optimal selection of a sequence of experiments and sequential 
decision making [18].
In the general setting, when the goal is to infer w or functions of w without specification of 
particular hypotheses, a typical choice for the goal function G(0, w, e, d) reads
G(0, w, e, d) =  logP(w |d, e, D n, a) — log P (w |D n , a) ,
which makes G(e) the expected change in Shannon information or, equivalently, the Kullback- 
Leibler divergence between the posterior and prior density of w.
3.3  O p tim a l u t ility  e lic ita t io n
The question remains what optimality criterion, i.e., goal function G(0, w, e, d) is most suited to 
our purposes. An obvious choice in the context of utility elicitation is the so-called expected utility, 
defined as [19, 11]
E U (0,w) =  E  P(x)U (x; 0, w) . (7)
x e x
Namely, if the utility state equals w, the best we can do is to optimize the expected utility with 
respect to 0. The posterior expected goal then boils down to what has been phrased the expected 
expected utility (EEU) in [3]: it contains two expectations, taking into account both the environ­
ment X  and the uncertainty over the utility states w G W. The optimal decision with maximum 
expected expected utility (MEEU) after having observed the data Dn is then
0* =  argm ax E E U n (0) ,
n 8e0
with
E E U n (0) =  V  P (x) /* dw P (w |D n )U(x; 0, w) .
xex J w
EEU seems to be a fairly natural concept given probabilistically quantified uncertainty over utilities 
and is therefore widely used (e.g., [5, 11, 9]). An alternative is the so-called minimax regret decision 
criterion as explained in [21].
W ith this choice, the pre-posterior utility function G(e) in (5) boils down to the expected value 
given perfect inform ation
E V |P In (e) =  V  max ƒ  dw P (d |e ,w )P (w |D n )E U (0,w) , (8)
d=±1 8 J w
where we substituted the posterior from (2) to note tha t the likelihood term  P(d |e, Dn ) drops out. 
Subtracting the maximum expected expected utility given no further information, we obtain the 
so-called expected value o f perfect in form ation :
E V P In(e) =  E V IP In(e) — E E U n(0n) .
Note th a t the ordering of the sum over d and the max w.r.t. 0 is crucial in (8): if we were allowed 
to interchange them we would obtain E E U n .
A lg o rith m  1 Incremental utility elicitation
1 n =  0
2 re p e a t
3 for a ll e G E  do
4 E V IP I  (e) =  0
5 for a ll d G { -1 , 1} do
6 for a ll 0 G 0  do
7 S(e, d, 0) =  ^ xex  P (x) f w  dw P (d |e, w )P(w |D n )U(x; 0, w)
8 e n d  for
9 E V |P I(e) =  E V |P I(e) +  m ax0 S(e, d, 0)
10 en d  for
11 e n d  for
12 e”+1 =  argm axe E V |P I (e)
13 Present e”+1 to the patient and observe d”+1
14
P (d n+1\en+ \w )P (w \D n )
( 1 n+1> f w  dw P (d "+ 1|e"+1, w )P (w \D n )
15 n =  n  + 1
16 u n til  some criterion is met
Since E E U „(0^) is independent of e, we conclude tha t Bayesian optimal design with the expected 
utility as goal function  boils down to m aximizing the expected value o f perfect information. The 
comparison between the (maximum) expected value of perfect information and the cost of doing 
an additional experiment provides for a natural stopping criterion. We could also choose other 
selection criteria, e.g., adapting G(0,w, e, d) to incorporate a penalty for unpleasant experiments, 
which would make G(0, w, e, d) indeed depend on e.
3.4  A lg o r ith m
To get a feeling for the algorithmic complexity, we describe the main algorithmic steps in pseudo­
code in Algorithm 1. In all this, we assume th a t the distribution P (x) of inputs, the patient model 
P (d |e, w), the utility function U(x; 0, w), and the prior P(w ) are all known and given.
The computational complexity of the exact brute-force algorithm is huge. It implies tha t for 
each combination of experiments e G E, responses d £ { — 1,1}, param eter settings 0 G 0 , and 
inputs x G X , we have to solve the integral over w G W in line 7 of Algorithm 1. In many cases, 
this will be completely unfeasible and we will have to find good approximations to prevent this (see 
the directions for further research below).
Another im portant issue is the Bayesian updating of the probability over utility states, line 14 of 
Algorithm 1. In general this will be intractable, and we will have to use techniques for approximate 
inference such as variational methods or Monte Carlo sampling.
4 A toy exam ple
To show the potential of this framework, we consider the following toy example. The input­
output relationship of the device is modeled by a feedforward neural network, i.e., y  =  F (x; 0) =  
0 tanh(A x+b) with A and b randomly drawn. The utility model is of the form U (y; w) =  e x p ( - |C y -  
w |2), with C  and w randomly drawn. A, b, and C are considered known to the decision maker, w is 
unknown to him (but is used to simulate the preferences of the patient in line 13 of Algorithm 1), 
and 0 has to be optimized. The environment consists of n x randomly drawn inputs. All random 
variables specified above are drawn independently from normal distributions with mean zero and 
unit variance.





Figure 2: Results on a toy example. (a) Ranking of the parameter setting 0^ (20 is best, 1 is worst) 
as a function of the number of experiments n  for the “optimal” design as described in Algorithm 1 
compared with a randomized design. (b) W idth of the (estimated) probability over utility states 
P (w |D n) for the two designs. Averages over 100 trials. See text for further explanation.
utility states w and how to compute the corresponding integrals. Here we consider a sampling 
approach known as the Gaussian particle filter (see e.g., [17]). For the prior P(w ) we take a normal 
distribution with variance 4. The library 0  consists of n g param eter settings 0, each of them 
optimized for a particular utility state w randomly drawn from the prior. This ensures th a t the 
library contains param eter settings tha t make sense. Note further tha t this setup is such tha t the 
patient model is rather noisy, i.e., for typical w and many experiments P (d |e, w) is closer to 0.5 
than to 0 or 1.
Results are displayed for the case in which the inputs x and outputs y are two-dimensional, 
the device model contains two hidden units, i.e., 0 is a two-by-two matrix, w is one-dimensional, 
n x =  10, n g =  20, and we use 100 particles in the Gaussian particle filter. The set of experiments 
E  then consists of 10 x 20 x 20 =  4000 possible combinations of inputs and parameters.
In Figure 2 we compare the optimal design, i.e., where at each iteration we choose the experiment 
e th a t maximizes the expected value of perfect information over E, with a randomized design, i.e., 
where at each iteration we draw an experiment e at random from E. Figure 2(a) displays the rank of 
the parameter setting 0^ chosen by the decision maker, which is the one th a t maximizes the expected 
expected utility given the decision maker’s estimate of the patien t’s utility, summarized in P (w |D n ). 
Note that, knowing the true utility state, we can rank the n g =  20 different param eter settings 
beforehand. A ranking of 20 means th a t the decision maker chose the best possible parameter 
setting (in the given library of 20 options), a ranking of 1 is the worst. Averages are over 100 
independent trials. It can be seen th a t the optimal design clearly outperforms the randomized 
design, much more quickly zooming in on the best param eter settings. It also appears to be 
saturating at a higher level. Figure 2(b) shows the evolution of the width of the (approximated) 
posterior P (w |D n ) for the two designs. As expected, the posterior in case of the optimal design 
tightens more quickly than the one for the randomized design.
5 D irections for further research
In this paper we have sketched a mathematical framework for adaptive personalization. It should 
be clear th a t this research has just started: there are many challenges still to tackle before it can 
be applied to nontrivial practical problems.
• Bayesian updating. We have to keep track of the probability density P (w |D n ) and compute 
integrals over W involving this density (lines 14 and 7 of Algorithm 1). Here we used the 
Gaussian particle filter, but other approximate inference techniques should also be considered.
• E fficient optim ization. To compute the next optimal experiment, we have to optimize over 
the sample spaces 0  and E  (lines 9 and 12 of Algorithm 1). Especially the cardinality of E  
can become huge and we will need optimization methods tha t can provide good suboptimal 
solutions within reasonable time, such as simulating annealing or genetic algorithms. For 
example, in [22] simulated annealing is applied to optimize the design of microarray studies 
and in [20] genetic algorithms are used to optimize the design of fMRI experiments. Apart 
from that, mathematical properties can be exploited to restrict the search space dramatically.
• Replacing expensive on-line calculations by functional mappings. Even with the above approx­
imations, on-line calculation of the optimal experimental design may still be computationally 
too demanding in practice. However, following the probabilistic framework laid out in sec­
tion 2 and 3, we can simulate many experiments and based on those learn relevant functions. 
Similar ideas are applied in the context of Markov decision processes, in particular for com­
puting the so-called value functions [14, 2].
• N onm yopic experimental design. In the above, we have mainly discussed the case of choosing 
one experiment at a time, sometimes referred to as the myopic approach [10]. It would be even 
better if we could solve the more general so-called nonmyopic case of optimally choosing the 
next k experiments. In this case, however, the computations become much more involved and 
in fact scale exponentially with k. An approximation, linear in the number of experiments, 
is described in [15]. In [2] the problem of nonmyopic preference elicitation is formulated and 
approximately solved in terms of a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP).
• Design choices. Depending on the particular application, many design choices have to be 
made. Examples are appropriate representations of the device model, utility function, and 
prior distribution, some of which may be learned from a collection of experiments on different 
patients. Another issue is the construction of useful libraries X , 0 ,  and E. For example, 
for clarity of exposition we have chosen E  =  X  x 0  x 0 , but we might as well base our 
library of experiments on different sets of inputs and parameter settings (e.g., those tha t are 
known to be discriminative). Last but not least, we focused on expected expected utility as 
the terminal decision criterion. Other criteria, such as the minimax regret decision criterion 
introduced by [21], deserve to be studied as well.
• Theoretical analysis. Even in our toy example, it takes at least about 50 questions to converge. 
It would be interesting to study how this scales as a function of the number of dimensions, 
amount of noise, and so on. In simple cases, using information-theoretical arguments, it might 
be possible to compute the best possible performance of any algorithm. This would give an 
indication of the practical feasibility. Furthermore, it would tell us when it makes no sense 
to further improve an existing algorithm.
• System  comparison. In this paper the target of the analysis was to estimate the optimal 
param eter value(s) 0* for algorithm y =  F(x; 0). In the process of searching for the optimal 
value 0*, we also obtain the maximum expected expected utility M E E U  =  E E U (0*), which 
can be used as a (perceptual) performance metric for algorithm F . The M E E U  can be used 
to compare different algorithms (and select the best). The metric can also be extended to 
predict performance for a patient population by marginalization of the M E E U  over a prior 
patient profile distribution P (a). Performance measures such as these are within our scope of 
future research.
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